

## Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-19

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NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20 IO-14

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FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 508

SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO USMISSION NATO IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 VIENNA 9285

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: DRAFT ALLIED FRAMEWORK PROPOSAL

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

1. BEGIN SUMMARY. WASHINGTON AGENCIES HAVE APPROVED EARLY TABLING IN EAST-WEST PLENARY OF ALLIED FRAMEWORK PROPOSAL. AD HOC GROUP HAS RECOMMENDED THIS APPROACH TO NAC. THIS PRESENTATION SHOULD TAKE PLACE IF POSSIBLE DURING WEEK OF NOVEMBER 18, REQUIRING THAT A DRAFT BE TABLED IN AD HOC GROUP NO LATER THAN TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 13. TEXT BELOW, DRAFTED IN FORM OF A PLENARY STATEMENT, WHICH IS MOST EFFECTIVE MODE OF PRESENTATION, IS INTENDED FOR DELIVERY BY AN ALLIED REPRESENTATIVE, POSSIBLY NETHERLANDS REP QUARLES, AFTER FINAL APPROVAL BY NAC. WE WOULD PLAN TO AIM FOR AD HOC GROUP APPROVAL BY EVENING OF NOVEMBER 14 WITH PAPER TO BE TRANSMITTED

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TO NAC FOR FINAL APPROVAL ON NOVEMBER 15. ACTION REQUESTED:

WASHINGTON APPROVAL OF DRAFT TEXT BY OPENING OF BUSINESS LOCAL TIME, TUESDAY NOVEMBER 13. END SUMMARY.

PRESENTATION OF WESTERN FRAMEWORK PROPOSAL

1. BEGINNING WITH THE OPENING SESSION OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS AND MORE PARTICULARLY IN THE SESSIONS OF NOVEMBER 13 AND 15, MY COLLEAGUES AND I HAVE PRESENTED OUR GENERAL PROPOSALS FOR THE MUTUAL REDUCTION OF FORCES AND ARMAMENTS AND ASSOCIATED MEASURES IN CENTRAL EUROPE. WE DISCUSSED THE NATURE OF THE SECURITY PROBLEM IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND THEN EXPLORED THE SOLUTIONS WE PROPOSE TO VARIOUS ASPECTS OF THIS PROBLEM.

2. TODAY, I WISH TO TIE TOGETHER THE STRANDS OF OUR PREVIOUS PRESENTATIONS AND PRESENT OUR SPECIFIC PROPOSAL.

3. WE BELIEVE THIS PROPOSAL WILL CONTRIBUTE IN A SIGNIFICANT WAY TO A MORE STABLE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN US AND TO THE STRENGTHENING OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE. IT IS CONSISTENT WITH THE UNDIMINISHED SECURITY OF ALL CONCERNED. AND IT RESPONDS TO THE MAJOR PROBLEMS IN THE EXISTING SECURITY SITUATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

4. THE BASIC ELEMENTS OF OUR PROPOSAL ARE AS FOLLOWS:

5. WE PROPOSE THAT THE REDUCTION AREA CONSIST IF BELGIUM, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, LUXEMBOURG, THE NETHERLANDS AND POLAND. WE CONTINUE TO RESERVE OUR RIGHT TO RAISE AT AN APPROPRIATE TIME IN THE COURSE OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS THE QUESTION OF HOW AND TO WHAT EXTENT HUNGARY WILL BE INCLUDED IN FUTURE DECISIONS, AGREEMENTS OR MEASURES.

6. WE PROPOSE THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS FOCUS ON THE GROUND FORCES OF THE TWO SIDES IN CENTRAL EUROPE. GROUND FORCES ARE THE LARGEST AND MOST BASIC ELEMENT IN THE EAST/WEST CONFRONTATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE. THEY ARE OF DECISIVE POLITICAL AND MILITARY IMPORTANCE. WITHOUT THEM, IN THE LAST ANALYSIS, TERRITORIES CAN NEITHER BE SEIZED NOR

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HELD, NEITHER INVADED NOR DEFENDED. IT IS ONLY BY ADDRESSING GROUND FORCES THAT WE CAN DEAL WITH THE MAJOR DISPARITIES MAKING FOR INSTABILITIES IN THE EXISTING SITUATION. THUS, IT IS NOT ONLY LOGICAL BUT ALSO ESSENTIAL THAT WE FOCUS ON GROUND FORCES IF WE ARE TO ACCOMPLISH THE AGREED OBJECTIVES OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS.

7. WE PROPOSE AS AN OVERALL GOAL OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS

AGREEMENT TO MOVE TOWARD A RELATIONSHIP OF APPROXIMATE PARITY BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES IN CENTRAL EUROPE, EXPRESSED IN TERMS OF A COMMON CEILING AT A LOWER LEVEL OF FORCES ON NATO AND WARSAW PACT GROUND FORCE MANPOWER IN CENTRAL EUROPE, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT COMBAT CAPABILITY. EACH SIDE SHOULD REDUCE ITS GROUND FORCES IN ACTIVE UNITS IN THE REDUCTION AREA TO THE SAME AGREED LOWER LEVEL OF MANPOWER. THIS IS WHAT WE MEAN BY A COMMON CEILING. A COMMON CEILING WOULD CONTRIBUTE IMPORTANTLY TO A MORE STABLE RELATIONSHIP BY ELIMINATING THE EXISTING DISPARITY IN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER.

8. THIS GOAL WOULD BE FAIR AND EQUITABLE. IT WOULD NOT DIMINISH THE SECURITY OF ANY PARTICIPANT. IT WOULD CREATE A MORE STABLE RELATIONSHIP, THUS STRENGTHENING PEACE AND SECURITY. THIS WOULD BE IN THE INTERESTS OF ALL.

9. AT THE SAME TIME, BY TAKING APPROPRIATE ACCOUNT OF COMBAT CAPABILITY, IT WOULD ADDRESS THE DISPARITY IN TANKS--A SIGNIFICANT FACTOR MAKING FOR INSTABILITY IN THE PRESENT SITUATION AND A SOURCE OF PARTICULAR CONCERN TO US. THIS TOO WOULD CONTRIBUTE IMPORTANTLY TO ENHANCING STABILITY IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

10. LET ME ILLUSTRATE FOR YOU, IN CONCRETE TERMS, OUR PROPOSAL FOR A COMMON CEILING IN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER. THE COMMON CEILING WE ARE PROPOSING ON NATO AND WARSAW PACT GROUND FORCE MANPOWER IN CENTRAL EUROPE MIGHT BE ESTABLISHED AT A LOWER LEVEL, PERHAPS ONE OF APPROXIMATELY 700,000 MEN ON EACH SIDE. THIS WOULD REPRESENT A SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION BELOW PRESENT MANPOWER LEVELS. YET IT WOULD NOT REPRESENT A REDUCTION SO LARGE IN ITSELF AS TO BE DESTABILIZING OR INCALCULABLE IN ITS EFFECTS. NEITHER SIDE NEED FEAR THAT ITS SECURITY WOULD BE DIMINISHED.

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AT A LEVEL OF 700,000 GROUND FORCE PERSONNEL ON EACH SIDE, THE DEFENSIVE CAPABILITIES OF BOTH SIDES WOULD REMAIN SUFFICIENT TO PROVIDE FIRM ASSURANCE OF THE ABILITY TO DEFEND AGAINST AN ATTACK. MOREOVER, IN A NEW AND IMPROVED RELATIONSHIP OF NUMERICAL EQUALITY IN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES, STABILITY WOULD BE A SIGNIFICANTLY ENHANCED.

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FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 509

SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO USMISSION NATO IMMEDIATE

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MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

11. WE PROPOSE THAT REDUCTION TO THE COMMON CEILING TAKE PLACE IN TWO SUCCESSIVE PHASES. THIS WOULD BE AN EFFECTIVE WAY TO PROCEED. IT WOULD BUILD INCREASED MUTUAL CONFIDENCE WHILE PRESERVING UNDIMINISHED SECURITY. REDUCTIONS WOULD IN EACH PHASE BE SUBSTANTIAL AND SIGNIFICANT, YET NOT SO LARGE AS TO BE UNMANAGEABLE OR INCALCULABLE IN THEIR EFFECTS.

12. IN THE FIRST PHASE, WE PROPOSE THAT US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES IN THE AGREED AREA BE REDUCED. THIS ACTION WOULD BE IN KEEPING WITH THE SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE US AND SOVIET UNION FOR PRESERVING PEACE IN EUROPE AND THE WORLD. IT WOULD BE A PRACTICAL WAY TO PROCEED. IT TAKES AC-  
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COUNT OF THE FACT THAT US AND SOVIET FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE ARE THE LARGEST AND MOST SIGNIFICANT FORCES FROM OUTSIDE THE ARE.

13. IT IS OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE THAT REDUCTIONS BE SUCH AS TO CONTRIBUTE MEANINGFULLY TO AN IMPROVEMENT IN THE EXISTING SITUATION. IN ORDER TO ENHANCE STABILITY, FORCES MUST BE REDUCED IN A WAY WHICH ELIMINATES, REDUCES, OR OFFSETS THE MAJOR DISPARITIES MAKING FOR INSTABILITY IN THE EXISTING SITUATION: NAMELY, THE SIGNIFICANT DISPARITIES IN MANPOWER, CHARACTER OF FORCES AND GEOGRAPHY. IN OUR EARLIER PRESENTATIONS, WE EXPLAINED IN GENERAL TERMS HOW WE WOULD PROPOSE, IN A REDUCTION AGREEMENT, TO DEAL WITH THESE DISPARITIES. TODAY, I HAVE PROPOSED IN SPECIFIC TERMS HOW TO ELIMINATE, IN AN EQUITABLE WAY THAT MAINTAINS UNDIMINISHED SECURITY FOR ALL, THE DISPARITY IN MANPOWER. I WILL NOW PRESENT OUR SPECIFIC PROPOSALS FOR DEALING WITH DISPARITIES IN THE CHARACTER OF FORCES AND IN GEOGRAPHY.

14. AS REGARDS THE EXISTING DISPARITY IN CHARACTER OF FORCES, IT IS AN UNDENIABLE FACT THAT THERE IS A LARGE IMBALANCE IN TANKS IN CENTRAL EUROPE. THE SOVIET UNION MAINTAINS, IN THE HEART OF EUROPE, AN ARMORED CAPABILITY WHICH -- BY ANY OBJECTIVE MILITARY STANDARD -- APPEARS TO US TO BE FAR IN EXCESS OF ACTUAL DEFENSIVE REQUIREMENTS. IN CONCRETE TERMS WHILE NATO MAINTAINS ONLY 6,000 TANKS IN ACTIVE UNITS IN THE AREA, THE WARSAW PACT MAINTAINS 15,500. IT IS ONLY NATURAL THAT THERE SHOULD BE QUESTIONS AS TO WHY SUCH A CONCENTRATION OF TANKS IS NECESSARY. A REDUCTION IN THE NUMBER WOULD, IN OUR VIEW, BE A MAJOR STEP TOWARD GREATER MUTUAL CONFIDENCE AND GREATER STABILITY IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND WOULD HELP MEET A PARTICULAR WESTERN CONCERN. TO REDUCE THIS DESTABILIZING DISPARITY, WE PROPOSE THAT THE SOVIET UNION WITHDRAW ONE OF ITS TWO TANK ARMIES IN THE AREA. THIS WOULD MEAN THE WITHDRAWAL FROM THE AREA TO THE SOVIET UNION OF 68,000 SOVIET SOLDIERS IN MAJOR UNITS WITH THEIR EQUIPMENT, INCLUDING 1,700 TANKS. THIS WOULD BE ABOUT 15 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL  
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SOVIET GROUND FORCES IN THE REDUCTION AREA.

15. IN RETURN, THE US WOULD WITHDRAW TO THE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES A PROPORTION OF THE MANPOWER OF ITS GROUND FORCES IN THE AREA EQUAL TO THE PROPORTION OF SOVIET GROUND FORCES WITHDRAWN. IN CONCRETE TERMS, THIS WOULD MEAN THE WITHDRAWAL ACROSS THE ATLANTIC OCEAN OF 15 PERCENT OF US GROUND FORCE PERSONNEL IN THE AREA, OR ABOUT 29,000 AMERICAN SOLDIERS. SUCH A REDUCTION OF EQUAL PERCENTAGES WOULD BE EQUITABLE IN ITSELF; MORE IMPORTANTLY,

IT WOULD BE A MEANINGFUL STEP TOWARD A MORE STABLE  
RELATIONSHIP IN THE AREA. AN EQUAL PERCENTAGE REDUCTION  
OF 15 PERCENT WOULD BE A SIGNIFICANT FIRST STEP TOWARD  
A COMMON CEILING IN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER, YET NOT SO LARGE  
AS TO RISK BEING DESTABILIZING.

16. AS REGARDS GEOGRAPHIC DISPARITIES, THESE AMERICAN  
SOLDIERS WOULD BE WITHDRAWN A MUCH GREATER DISTANCE FROM  
THE REDUCTION AREA THAN WOULD THE SOVIET SOLDIERS, AT LEAST  
5000 KILOMETERS. IT WOULD BE MORE DIFFICULT, BY FAR, TO  
RETURN THE AMERICAN SOLDIERS -- ONCE WITHDRAWN -- TO THE  
AREA, THAN IT WOULD BE TO RETURN THE SOVIET SOLDIERS. THE LATTER  
WOULD BE WITHDRAWN, WITH THEIR EQUIPMENT, A RELATIVELY  
SHORT DISTANCE OF 650 KILOMETERS OVER LAND TO THE SOVIET  
UNION, WHICH ADJOINS THE REDUCTION AREA; THEIR RETURN WOULD  
BE RELATIVELY EASY. US SOLDIERS, ON THE OTHER HAND, WOULD  
BE WITHDRAWN ACROSS AN OCEAN TO ANOTHER CONTINENT. THUS,  
US AND SOVIET REDUCTIONS CANNOT BE EQUATED BY ANY SIMPLISTIC  
FORMULA. THE GEOGRAPHIC DISPARITY IS SO GREAT THAT EQUITY  
AND THE CRITERION OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY REQUIRE THAT IT  
BE TAKEN INTO FULL ACCOUNT. CONSEQUENTLY, IN ANY  
REDUCTION AGREEMENT, WE PROPOSE THAT, AT US DISCRETION,  
US SOLDIERS BE WITHDRAWN, EITHER AS INDIVIDUALS OR IN  
UNITS, AND THAT THE EQUIPMENT OF ANY US UNITS  
WITHDRAWN BE STORED AND MAINTAINED IN THE AGREED ARE.  
THIS APPROACH WOULD BE EQUITABLE; IT WOULD CONFER NO DISADVANTAGES  
ONTO THE SOVIET UNION WHICH -- BECAUSE OF ITS GEOGRAPHIC  
PROXIMITY TO THE REDUCTION AREA -- WOULD RETAIN A SUPERIOR  
REINFORCEMENT CAPABILITY IN ANY EVENT.

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FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 510  
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AMEMBASSY LONDON  
USNMR SHAPE  
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MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

17. WE PROPOSE THAT, IN THE CONTEXT OF NEGOTIATING A REDUCTION AGREEMENT, BOTH SIDES SHOULD AGREE ON CERTAIN STABILIZING MEASURES. THESE MEASURES WOULD ENHANCE STABILITY AND INCREASE MUTUAL CONFIDENCE THROUGH REDUCING FEAR OF SURPRISE ATTACK AND THE RISK OF MISUNDERSTANDING OF MISCALCULATION ARISING OUT OF AMBIGUOUS MILITARY ACTIVITY. THIS OUTCOME IS IN THE INTERESTS OF ALL. MEASURES DESIGNED TO PROMOTE IT WOULD BOTH FACILITATE NEGOTIATIONS ON REDUCTIONS AND MAKE REDUCTION AGREEMENTS THEMSELVES MORE EFFECTIVE. MOREOVER, THEY WOULD CONTRIBUTE IN A DIRECT AND IMPORTANT WAY TO A MORE STABLE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SIDES -- ONE OF THE AGREED OBJECTIVES OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS.

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18. BOTH SIDES HAVE A MUTUAL INTEREST IN ENSURING THAT THE PROVISIONS OF REDUCTION AGREEMENTS ARE CARRIED OUT AND FAITHFULLY MAINTAINED. ONLY WITH SUCH ASSURANCE CAN MUTUAL CONFIDENCE BE ENHANCED AND SUSTAINED. WE PROPOSE, THEREFORE, AGREEMENT ON VERIFICATION MEASURES DESIGNED TO DO THIS, AND TO BUILD MUTUAL CONFIDENCE. AT AN APPROPRIATE LATER STAGE OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS, WE WILL BE MAKING MORE DETAILED PROPOSALS FOR MEASURES OF VERIFICATION. WE PROPOSE THAT SUCH MEASURES INCLUDE AGREEMENT ON NON-INTERFERENCE WITH NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS. A BASIS FOR AGREEMENT ON THIS POINT APPEARS TO EXIST ALREADY.

19. SIMILARLY, BOTH SIDES HAVE A MUTUAL INTEREST IN REDUCTION AGREEMENTS, ONCE REACHED, WILL NOT BE CIRCUMVENTED OR UNDERMINED. WE PROPOSE, THEREFORE, THAT A REDUCTION AGREEMENT INCLUDE APPROPRIATE PROVISION TO ENSURE NON-CIRCUMVENTION OF THE AGREEMENT. WE WILL MAKE MORE DETAILED PROPOSALS ON THIS TOPIC AT A LATER POINT IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS.

20. WE PROPOSE THAT, IN THE CONTEXT OF A FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT ON REDUCTION OF US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE, AGREEMENT WOULD BE REACHED PROVIDING FOR A SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS. THIS SECOND PHASE WOULD COMPLETE MOVEMENT TO THE OVERALL GOAL OF A COMMON MANPOWER CEILING ON NATO AND WARSAW PACT GROUND FORCES IN THE AGREED AREA.

21. AGREEMENT ON THE PROPOSAL WE HAVE ADVANCED TODAY WOULD REPRESENT A SUBSTANTIAL AND SIGNIFICANT FORWARD STEP IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS. IT WOULD BE EQUITABLE; IT WOULD PRESERVE UNDIMINISHED SECURITY FOR ALL CONCERNED. MOST IMPORTANTLY, IT WOULD BE THE BASIS OF A MORE STABLE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES. IT WOULD STRENGTHEN PEACE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE. IT WOULD FULFILL THE AGREED OBJECTIVES OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS AND REPRESENT A MAJOR ACCOMPLISHMENT OF WHICH WE COULD JUSTLY BE PROUD.

22. LET ME NOW SUMMARIZE FOR YOUR CONVENIENCE, IN  
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A CONCISE FORM, THE BASIS ELEMENTS OF OUR PROPOSAL:

A. AGREEMENT WOULD BE REACHED ON THE CONCEPT OF COMMON CEILING FOR GROUND FORCE MANPOWER FOR NATO AND WARSAW PACT GROUND FORCES IN A REDUCTION AREA CONSISTING OF BELGIUM, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, LUXEMBOURG, THE NETHERLANDS, AND POLAND -- THE RIGHT TO RAISE THE QUESTION OF HUNGARY IS RESERVED.

B. THE SOVIET UNION WOULD WITHDRAW 15 PERCENT OF ITS GROUND FORCES FROM THE AGREED AREA IN THE FORM OF A TANK ARMY; THAT IS, FIVE DIVISIONS AND RELATED ELEMENTS, CONSISTING OF 68,000 SOVIET SOLDIERS IN MAJOR UNITS WITH THEIR EQUIPMENT INCLUDING 1,700 TANKS. THESE FORCES AND THEIR EQUIPMENT WOULD BE RETURNED TO THE SOVIET UNION.

C. THE US WOULD WITHDRAW 15 PERCENT OF ITS GROUND FORCE MANPOWER FROM THE AGREED AREA, OR ABOUT 29,000 US SOLDIERS. THESE SOLDIERS COULD, AT US DISCRETION, BE WITHDRAWN EITHER AS INDIVIDUALS OR IN UNITS. THEY WOULD BE RETURNED TO THE UNITED STATES. EQUIPMENT BELONGING TO ANY UNITS WITHDRAWN COULD AT US DISCRETION BE STORED AND MAINTAINED IN THE REDUCTION AREA.



D. THE PARTIES WOULD AGREE ON:

-- STABILIZING MEASURES AIMED AT BUILDING CONFIDENCE  
BY REDUCING THE RISK OF MISUNDERSTANDINGS AND AMBIGUOUS  
MILITARY ACTIVITY;  
-- VERIFICATION MEASURES TO ENSURE THAT THE PROVISIONS  
OF AGREEMENTS WERE BEING CARRIED OUT AND TO BUILD MUTUAL  
CONFIDENCE; AND  
-- APPROPRIATE MEASURES TO ENSURE THAT AGREEMENTS WOULD  
NOT BE CIRCUMVENTED OR UNDERMINED.

E. AGREEMENT WOULD ALSO BE REACHED ON CONTINUING THE  
NEGOTIATIONS IN A SECOND PHASE.

F. THE PARTIES WOULD AGREE IN A SECOND PHASE  
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OF NEGOTIATIONS TO COMPLETE MOVEMENT TOWARD APPROXIMATE  
PARITY BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES IN THE FORM OF A COMMON CEILING  
ON NATO AND WARSAW PACT GROUND FORCES MANPOWER IN THE  
REDUCTION AREA AT APPROXIMATELY 700,000 MEN ON EACH SIDE.

3. THESE POINTS SUMMARIZE FOR YOU IN BARE OUTLINE THE BASIC  
ELEMENTS OF OUR PROPOSAL. IT REPRESENTS A REALISTIC AND  
PRACTICAL SOLUTION TO DIFFICULT AND IMPORTANT SECURITY  
PROBLEMS WHICH THESE NEGOTIATIONS MUST ADDRESS.  
AGREEMENT ALONG THESE LINES WOULD BE A MAJOR CON-  
TRIBUTION TO ENHANCE STABILITY, PEACE AND SECURITY IN  
EUROPE. WE LOOK FORWARD TO MUTUAL DISCUSSION OF THE DETAILS  
OF OUR PROPOSAL IN THE COMING PERIOD WITH A VIEW TO  
AGREEMENT. END TEXT.HUMES

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